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Abstract—This paper analyzes the information disclosure prob-
lems originated in economics through the lens of information
theory. Such problems are radically different from the conven-
tional communication paradigms in information theory since they
involve different objectives for the encoder and the decoder,
which are aware of this mismatch and act accordingly. This
leads, in our setting, to a hierarchical communication game,
where the transmitter announces an encoding strategy with
full commitment, and its distortion measure depends on a
private information sequence whose realization is available at
the transmitter. The receiver decides on its decoding strategy
that minimizes its own distortion based on the announced
encoding map and the statistics. Three problem settings are
considered, focusing on the quadratic distortion measures, and
jointly Gaussian source and private information: compression,
communication, and the simple equilibrium conditions without
any compression or communication. The equilibrium strategies
and associated costs are characterized. The analysis is then
extended to the receiver side information setting and the major
changes in structure of optimal strategies are identified. Finally,
an extension of the results to the broader context of decentralized
stochastic control is presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
The field of information economics (IE) has considered
several different models of “communication” (information
transmission) between two agents, a transmitter and a receiver,
with different objectives, see for example the well-known
strategic information transmission (SIT) and information dis-
closure models [3], [4], [6].
The conclusions of such studies (especially the structure
of transmitter/receiver policies achieving equilibrium) are par-
ticularly interesting from an information-theoretic (IT) view-
point, given the relative dearth of results in this field related
to mismatched goals between the transmitter and the receiver.
Indeed, most IT models to date that have considered source
compression with mismatched distortion measures have done
so in a context where mismatch was caused either by Nature
(as in the worst-case or robust design approaches of [7], [8])
or by a secondary adversarial decoder [9]. On the other hand,
communication models in IE do not consider compression
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or actual physical channel which are of main interest in
IT [10]. This work studies the interplay of the game and
the communication aspects of such strategic communication
models in IE and IT.
More specifically, this work focuses on compression and
communication scenarios where the better informed transmit-
ter communicates with a receiver who makes the ultimate deci-
sion concerning both agents. The objectives of the transmitter
and the receiver are only partially aligned. As opposed to the
classical work in economics, which is strategic information
transmission [6], we consider the problem as a Stackelberg
game [11] where the transmitter is committed to its policy1 ex-
ante, and the receiver (the follower) is aware of the transmitter
(the leader) policy and optimizes it as a function of the
encoding policy and the statistics. In this sense, our model is
along the lines of some recent works in IE, namely information
disclosure [4] and Bayesian persuasion [3]. This framework is
similar to the conventional communication settings analyzed
in IT (see e.g., [10]), in terms of the commitment based
on statistics (not realization) as opposed to [6]. Hence, it
enables the use of Shannon theoretic arguments [10] to derive
fundamental limits of compression and communication.
As a side note, we note that very recently the optimality of
linear policies for a generalized version of this problem was in-
dependently shown in the working paper [5], using tools from
convex optimization. We also note that Stackelberg games
with quadratic objectives and Gaussian variables (which will
be referred to as quadratic-Gaussian (Q-G) setting throughout
the paper) have been well studied in the control literature, see
e.g., [12]. However, the problems we consider here involve
communication (and hence, in a sense, non-classical informa-
tion structures [13]) and are therefore fundamentally different
from the ones in control without any communication. Control
problems with communication (cf. [14]), particularly ones with
Gaussian channels have been analyzed in non-strategic settings
employing the Shannon bounds. However, there are no known
Shannon-like bounds in the strategic settings, and this is indeed
the main subject of this paper.
Highlights of the contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We show, using statistical tools widely used in informa-
tion theory, that linear policies are uniquely optimal for
the Q-G simple equilibrium (without any compression or
noise in the communication).
1In this paper, we use “policy” and “strategy” interchangeably.
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• We determine the single-letter characterization of the fun-
damental limits of strategic compression, and explicitly
compute this quantity for the Q-G setting.
• We show optimality of single-letter linear strategies in
the Q-G communication setting. This result parallels the
well-known optimality of single-letter mappings for the
same setting, but without the strategic aspect of the
problem [15].
• We analyze the impact of the receiver side information
on the structure of the results.
• Finally, we demonstrate the use of information theoretic
results in strategic decision making/control problems in-
volving the Gaussian test channel.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
R and R+ denote the respective sets of real numbers and
positive real numbers. We let E(·) denote the expectation
operator. The Gaussian density with mean µ and variance σ2 is
denoted by N (µ, σ2). All logarithms in the paper are natural
logarithms, and the integrals are, in general, Lebesgue inte-
grals. S denotes the set of Borel measurable, square integrable
functions {f : R → R}. All the alphabets used in this paper
are the real line, but for clarity we denote them by separate
letters X , θ, and Xˆ for the source, the private information, and
the reconstruction, respectively. We use standard information
theoretic and game theoretic notations for the related results
throughout this paper (cf. [11], [16]).
B. Overview of Communication Games in Economics
There exists a vast amount of literature in economics
on communicating information in transmitter-receiver games:
using as advertising [17], [18], education [19], disclosure of
verifiable information [20], or cheap talk [6], or information
disclosure [3], [4]. Here, we review two distinct, well-known
models: The cheap talk model of [6] and the more relevant
information disclosure model in [4] and [3].
1) Strategic Information Transmission (Cheap Talk): In the
SIT model [6], there are two players: a transmitter and a
receiver. The state information, X , is drawn from a population
with density f(·) with bounded support, say [0, 1]. X is
available only to the transmitter. The receiver, based on the
transmitter output, takes action a ∈ R. The utility functions
of the transmitter and the receiver are respectively UT (x, a, b)
and UR(x, a), where b is a deterministic bias parameter that
measures the differences in the preferences of the agents. All
aspects of the game, except the realization of X , are common
knowledge.
The game is described as follows: the transmitter observes
the source output X and transmits a message y ∈ Y , where
Y is an infinite set. The receiver observes y and chooses an
action a ∈ R which determines the pay-offs. A pure strategy2
equilibrium comprises an encoding strategy g∗ : [0, 1] → Y
2Limitation to pure strategies does not introduce any loss of generality here.
and a decoding (action) strategy h∗ : Y → R (hence, a =
h(Y )) such that
g∗(X) = argmax
g
UT (X,h
∗(g(X)), b)
h∗(Y ) = argmax
h
E{UR(X,h(Y ))|Y }
(1)
where Y = g∗(X). Note that the pair (g∗, h∗) constitutes
a Nash equilibrium for the underlying two-player game. We
also note that such a pair is not necessarily unique. In fact,
there may exist multiple Nash equilibria, each one leading to a
different cost pair; see e.g., [21] on the selection of the “best”
equilibrium among these. An interesting aspect is that there
is no cost associated with the message y, which is why this
setting has also been referred to as “cheap talk” [22]. The
main result of [6] states that the mappings at the equilibrium
have structure:
Theorem 1 ([6]). Any g∗(X) and h∗(Y ) that satisfy (1) are
non-injective (quantizer based) mappings.
This result has several interesting aspects. First, in contrast
with the classical communication setting, where quantization
is imposed by rate constraint or channel noise, here quantiza-
tion occurs solely because of the mismatch between agents’
objectives. Second, this structural result holds for any arbitrary
source3, even for the Q-G setting. Third, a frequently exploited
result in estimation and control theory states optimality of
linear strategies for the Q-G setting, see e.g., [24]; hence it is
surprising to see that such an optimal structure breaks down
in a strategic setting.
An important aspect of the SIT model is that the transmitter
is not committed to any mappings before seeing the realization
of X , i.e., the transmitter decides on the mapping g(·) after
seeing the realization of X . Hence, a Nash equilibrium is
sought among all transmitter/receiver strategies. While the
conclusions of the SIT model are very interesting for an
information theorist (e.g., the main mathematical tool in lossy
source coding, the quantizer, arises entirely from strategic
aspect of the problem), the model does not apply to settings
in communication where the transmitter is committed to its
encoding map which is designed purely based on statistics
and used repeatedly.
2) Overview of Information Disclosure Model (Bayesian
Persuasion): Consider now the Stackelberg solution as op-
posed to the Nash equilibrium considered in [6] (keeping
all other features of the cheap talk game described above
unaltered), where the transmitter is the leader and the receiver
is the follower. The game proceeds as follows: the transmitter
plays first and announces an encoding mapping. As opposed
to the game in [6], the transmitter is committed to its encoding
mapping, i.e., the transmitter cannot change it after the receiver
plays. The receiver, knowing this commitment, determines its
own mapping that maximizes its pay-off, given the encoding
mapping. The transmitter, of course, will anticipate this, and
pick its mapping accordingly.
3When the distortion measures are quadratic, the technical requirement on
the source statistics, that is having a density with bounded support, can be
removed; see e.g., [23]
In [3], this setting is studied with scalar state and mappings,
and conditions for which full or no disclosure are optimal are
characterized. In [4], the same problem setting is studied with
two-dimensional state and private information available only
to the receiver. Both of these works analyze the optimal strate-
gies for discrete variables. In [5], [25], noiseless Stackelberg
equilibrium involving Gaussian variables and quadratic pay-
off functions is studied.
C. Setting-1: Simple (Noiseless) Equilibrium
Here we introduce one of the problems studied in this
paper. Consider the general communication system whose
block diagram is depicted in Figure 1. The source X and
private information θ are mapped into U ∈ R which is fully
determined by the conditional distribution p(·|x, θ). For the
sake of brevity, and with a slight abuse of notation, we refer
to this as a stochastic mapping U = g(X, θ), so that
P(g(X, θ) ∈ U) =
∫
u′∈U
p(u′|x, θ)du′ ∀U ⊆ R (2)
holds almost everywhere in X and θ. Let the set of all
such mappings be denoted by Γ (which has a one-to-one
correspondence to the set of all the conditional distributions
that construct the transmitter output U ).
In the most general communication setting (see Sections
II-E and III-C), we consider an additive noise channel as
shown in Figure 1, with Gaussian noise N ∼ N (0, σ2N ), hence
the input to the receiver is Y = U + N . Here, however we
focus on the simpler problem where there is no channel noise,
i.e., we effectively assume σ2N = 0, and hence Y = U (almost
everywhere). The receiver produces an estimate of the source
Xˆ through a mapping h ∈ S as Xˆ = h(Y ). The objective of
the receiver is to pick h ∈ S so as to minimize
DD = E{dD(X, Xˆ)} (3)
where dD : X ×Xˆ → R+ is the distortion measure associated
with the receiver’s distortion. The objective of the transmitter
is to minimize
DE = E{dE(X, θ, Xˆ)} (4)
using the freedom in the choice of the mapping g(·, ·) ∈ Γ,
given that the receiver chooses h ∈ S as above, where dE :
X × θ×Xˆ → R+ is the transmitter’s distortion metric. In the
following, we present this optimization problem formally:
Problem 1. Find essentially unique4 g∗(·, ·) ∈ Γ and h∗(·) ∈
S that satisfy
g∗(X, θ) = argmin
g∈Γ
dE(X, θ, h
∗(g(X, θ))
h∗(Y ) = argmin
h∈S
E {dD(X,h(Y )|Y }
4In this noiseless setting, the encoding/decoding mappings F (g(X, θ)) and
F−1(h(Y )) yield the same costs as g(X, θ) and h(Y ), where F (·) is any
invertible function. This function corresponds to different permutations of
labels if the message space is finite as assumed in most prior work in IE [3],
[4], [6]. To account for such trivially equivalent pairs of mappings, we use
the term “essentially unique”.
Xˆ+
N
Y
h(Y )
U
(X, ✓) g(X, ✓)
h(Y,W )
W
Fig. 1: The strategic variant of the Gaussian test channel, with
or without receiver side information W .
where Y = g(X, θ).
Quadratic-Gaussian Setting: Most of our results concern
the setting where the source and the private information are
jointly Gaussian i.e., (X, θ) ∼ N (0, RXθ) where, without
any loss of generality, RXθ is parametrized as RXθ =
σ2X
[
1 ρ
ρ r
]
, with r > ρ2, and the distortion measures are
given as follows:
dE(x, θ, y) = (x+ θ − y)2; dD(x, y) = (x− y)2. (5)
Hence, in the Q-G setting, we have the following cost func-
tions:
DE = E
{
(X + θ − Xˆ)2
}
; DD = E
{
(X − Xˆ)2
}
. (6)
Remark 1. The Q-G setting formulation (without any noise or
compression) can be viewed as a special case of the problem
analyzed in [5]. However, as shown later in Theorem 4, the
information-theoretic approach taken in this paper provides
more conclusive results, namely the uniqueness of the optimal
strategies, for this noiseless setting, and also allows for an
extension of the analysis to noisy settings.
Our result regarding this equilibrium is that, in sharp con-
trast with the original SIT which considers the Nash equi-
librium, the Stackelberg solution for the Q-G setting entails
linear encoding-decoding strategies as the essentially unique
optimal strategy pair (see Theorem 4). While the existence of
a linear optimal strategy can be shown using tools from convex
optimization (see [5]), proving the essential uniqueness of the
optimal policy poses a significant challenge, which can be
circumvented using two tools from probability theory. In the
following, we present an overview of these powerful tools.
1) Functional Representation Lemma: Like many ideas in
information theory, the functional representation lemma has its
roots in Shannon’s original pioneering work [26]. Since then,
different variations of this lemma have been used for different
problems in information theory, see e.g., [27]. The following
variation can be found in [28, page 626].
Lemma 1. For a given set of random variables X,Y,W , there
exist a random variable Z distributed independent of Y , and
a deterministic function γ such that W can be expressed as
W = γ(Y,Z)
and X − (Y,W )− Z forms a Markov chain in this order.
Xˆ+
N
Y
h(Y )
U h(Y,W )
W
X g(X)
Fig. 2: The (non-strategic) Gaussian test channel, with or
without receiver side information W .
2) Maximal Correlation Coefficient: The maximal corre-
lation coefficient between two random variables5 X and Y ,
introduced in [29], is
fm(X,Y ) = supE{f(X)g(Y )} (7)
where the supremum is taken over all (Borel) measurable
functions f, g with
E{f(X)}= E{g(Y )}=0, (8)
E{f2(X)}=E{g2(Y )}=1. (9)
The following is a well-known result, see e.g., [30] for a proof.
Lemma 2. For jointly Gaussian random variables ξ1 and ξ2,
fm(ξ1, ξ2) = |E{ξ1ξ2}| (10)
where the supremum in fm is achieved uniquely by linear
(identity) mappings.
Due to Lemma 2 and the tensorization6 property (shown
in [31]), maximal correlation has played a significant role in
several problems in information theory, see e.g., [32].
D. Setting-2: Strategic Compression
Let us first present an overview of the basic (non-strategic)
results in source compression. Assume a memoryless source
and a single-letter, bounded, and additive distortion measure
d : X × Y −→ R+, i.e.,
d(Xn, Y n) =
1
n
n∑
t=1
d(Xt, Yt) . (11)
A block code pair (fE , fD) consists of an encoding function
fE : Xn −→M which maps the source to index set M, and
a decoding function fD : M −→ Yn . A rate-distortion pair
(R,D) is called achievable if for every δ > 0 and sufficiently
large n, there exists a block code (fE , fD) such that
1
n
log |M| ≤ R+ δ
E{d(Xn, fD(fE(Xn)))} ≤ D + δ .
The fundamental result in information theory [16] is that the
rate-distortion (R-D) function expressing the minimum achiev-
able rate R for a prescribed level of distortion D, denoted as
R(D), is given by minimizing the mutual information I(X;Y )
5We assume, without any loss of generality, that the variables are zero-
mean.
6A measure of dependence Φ(X,Y ) is said to have tensorization property
if for any n i.i.d. tuples of X and Y, Φ(Xn, Y n) = Φ(X,Y ).
over all conditional distributions PY |X(y|x) that maintain the
prescribed distortion:
R(D) = inf
PY |X(y|x):E{d(X,Y )}≤D
I(X;Y ) . (12)
Now, we define the strategic compression problem similar
to its non-strategic counterpart where a memoryless source
Xn and a private information sequence θn are mapped to an
index set M by fE : Xn × θn −→ M. The decoder applies
fD :M−→ Yn to generate the reconstruction sequence Xˆn.
An achievable triple (R,DE , DD) satisfies
1
n
log |M| ≤ R+ δ
E{dnE(Xn, θn, fD(fE(Xn, θn)))} ≤ DE + δ
E{dnD(Xn, fD(fE(Xn, θn)))} ≤ DD + δ ,
for every δ > 0 and sufficiently large n. The set of achievable
triples (R,DE , DD) is denoted here as RDS .
Problem 2. Find the equilibrium points (R,DE , DD) in RDS
achieved by the mappings that satisfy:
f∗E(X
n, θn) = argmin
fE
E{dnE(Xn, θn, f∗D(fE(Xn, θn))}
f∗D(fE(X
n, θn)) = argmin
fD
E{dnD(Xn, fD(fE(Xn, θn))}
E. Setting-3: Gaussian Test Channel and Equilibrium with
Noisy Channel
Consider the general communication system whose block
diagram is shown in Figure 2, where the source X ∼
N (0, σ2X) is to be transmitted to the receiver via g ∈ S as
U = g(X) over an additive Gaussian channel; hence the input
to the receiver is Y = U + N , where N ∼ N(0, σ2N ) is
statistically independent of X . The receiver produces its output
Xˆ through an h ∈ S as Xˆ = h(Y )7. The objective of both
agents is to minimize E{(X−Xˆ)2}, while the transmitter has
an average power constraint E{U2} ≤ PT .
Although this problem is formulated in a single-letter set-
ting, the solution is obtained by expanding the feasible solution
space to n-letter strategies, i.e., by solving the information
theoretic version of the problem (Shannon sense optimality).
Obviously allowing more delay, the Shannon sense optimal
solution should perform at least as well as the zero-delay one.
The following well-known result of Goblick [15] states that
these solutions are in fact identical.
Theorem 2 ([15]). For the Gaussian test channel problem,
single-letter mappings
g(X) =
√
PT
σ2X
X, h(Y ) =
σ2X
PT + σ2N
√
PT
σ2X
Y
are the essentially unique8, Shannon sense optimal encod-
ing/decoding mappings.
7Here, by a slight abuse of notation, we take g and h belong to the same
set of mappings, S, which is the set of all Borel measurable, square integrable
functions.
8If the pair g(X) = cX and h(Y ) = dY is a solution to this problem, the
pair g(X) = −cX and h(Y ) = −dY is also a solution due to symmetry,
which is why the solution is “essentially” unique.
Remark 2. This optimality breaks down in the presence of
receiver side information (a situation which will be referred
to as SI throughout the paper), shown as W in Figure 2, and
in that case, linear strategies are no longer optimal even in the
set of zero-delay strategies (see e.g., [33]). This observation
highlights the fact that conclusions on optimality of linear
strategies in noiseless settings do not directly carry over to
noisy settings. As we will analyze in Section IV, the strategic
aspect brings up cases where an optimality result, similar
to the one in Theorem 2 holds in the strategic SI setting,
depending on the problem parameters.
In Section III-C, we investigate whether such a result holds
also for the strategic variant of the same problem depicted in
Figure 1. We refer to this setting as the “noisy equilibrium”
(see Section III-C) since this is essentially a noisy version of
the problem described in Section II-C. In the following, we
formalize this problem.
Problem 3. Find g∗(·, ·) ∈ Γ and h∗(·) ∈ S that satisfy
g∗(X, θ) = argmin
g∈Γ
E {dE(X, θ, h∗(Y )}
h∗(Y ) = argmin
h∈S
E{dD(X,h(Y )}
where Y = g(X, θ)+N , N ∼ N (0, σ2N ), and dE and dD are
as given in (5).
F. Decentralized Stochastic Control Problems
The optimality of linear strategies plays a central role
in many problems in control and economics, particularly in
team decision theory. While the solutions to linear, quadratic
and Gaussian (LQG) team problems with classical or quasi-
classical information structures are well known to be linear,
when the information structure is non-classical, such problems
may or may not admit linear (or affine) optimal solutions (cf.
[14]). The celebrated 1968 counterexample of Witsenhausen,
where optimal solution is not affine, belongs to this family
of problems [34]. Another example (of a problem with non-
classical information) is the Gaussian test channel, which
however admits a linear optimal solution (see Section II-E).
In the following, we present a generic setting associated with
these problems.
Consider the communication setting depicted in Figure 2
(without SI). All variables are Gaussian and the agents operate
through the mappings g, h ∈ S. The common objective of both
agents is minimization of J = E{ϕ(X,U, Xˆ)}: an expectation
of a function ϕ in the form of a second-order polynomial
of X,U and Xˆ , over the mappings g, h, where expectation
is over all random quantities involved. The Gaussian test
channel, which admits a linear optimal solution, corresponds
to ϕ = (X − Xˆ)2 + k1U2 with k1 > 0 (see Theorem 2).
The counterexample of Witsenhausen, which corresponds to
ϕ = (X + U − Xˆ)2 + k1U2 with k1 > 0, still admits an
optimal solution but it is not linear [34]. In [13], these two
results have been generalized to obtain the conditions on ϕ
which guarantee that the problem admits a linear (or affine)
optimal solution.
Theorem 3 ([13]). The problem admits a linear optimal
solution if, and only if, ϕ does not involve any product term
between U and Xˆ .
In Section V, we extend this result, which can be viewed
as a generalization of the Gaussian test channel, to strategic
settings. More formally, we have the following problem.
Problem 4. Find g∗(·, ·) ∈ Γ and h∗(·) ∈ S that satisfy
g∗(X, θ) = argminE{ϕE(X, θ, U, Xˆ)} (13)
h∗(Y ) = argminE{ϕD(X, θ, U, Xˆ)}
where Y = g(X, θ) + N , N ∼ N (0, σ2N ), and ϕE and ϕD
are second-order polynomials of X, θ, U, Xˆ .
III. MAIN RESULTS
A. Equilibrium Conditions
We first characterize the Q-G equilibrium with the noiseless
channel.
Theorem 4. In the noiseless Q-G setting, the essentially
unique solution to Problem 1 is given as g∗(X, θ) = X + αθ
and h∗(Y ) = κY , where α and κ are constants given as:
α =
A− 1
2(r + ρ)
, κ =
1 + αρ
1 + α2r + 2αρ
(14)
Costs at this Stackelberg solution are
DE =σ
2
X
(
1 +
(A− 3)(r + ρ)
A− 1
)
(15)
DD =σ
2
X
(
(r − ρ2)(A− 1)
A(2r +Aρ+ ρ)
)
(16)
where A =
√
1 + 4(r + ρ).
Proof. The optimal decoding mapping is h(Y ) = E{X|Y }
regardless of the choice of encoder’s policy g. Hence, the prob-
lem simplifies to an optimization over the encoding mapping
g. Consider the dual (equivalent) problem of minimizing DE
subject to a fixed DD. Expanding DE , we have
DE = E{(X−E{X|Y })2}+2E{θ(X−E{X|Y })}+E{θ2}.
Noting that the first term is DD, and the last term is E{θ2}
(constant with respect to the optimization variables), the prob-
lem simplifies to minimizing E{θΥ} over the joint distribution
of θ,Υ (with fixed marginal for θ), subject to
E{Υ2} = DD, E{Υ} = 0, (17)
where Υ is defined as Υ , X −E{X|Y }. Next, let us define
ΥG as the Gaussian reconstruction error that satisfies the
constraints in (17), i.e., the encoder generates Y = X+αθ+T ,
where α is a constant and T ∼ N (0, σ2T ) is independent, of
θ and X , and the decoder uses the optimal estimator which
is linear and hence yields jointly Gaussian reconstruction Xˆ
and reconstruction error X − Xˆ , ΥG. Using Lemma 1, we
relate the two random variables Υ,ΥG as
Υ = η(ΥG, Z) (18)
where η : R × R → R is a deterministic function and Z
is a random variable distributed independently from ΥG, and
Z − (ΥG,Υ)− θ forms a Markov chain in this order. Hence,
the objective can be expressed as: minimize
J = E{θη(ΥG, Z)} (19)
over η(·, ·) and the joint distribution of Z and θ which is
denoted here as fZ,θ(z, θ). Next, we expand J ′ = min
η(·,·),fZ,θ
J :
J ′ = min
η,fZ,θ
E{θη(ΥG, Z)} (20)
= min
η,fZ,θ
∫
E{θη(ΥG, Z)|Z = z}fZ(z)dz (21)
≥
∫
inf
η,fZ,θ
E{E{θη(ΥG, Z)|Z = z,ΥG,Υ}}fZ(z)dz
(22)
= min
fZ
∫
inf
ηz
E{θηz(ΥG)}fZ(z)dz (23)
where ηz : R→ R is a deterministic function that depends on
the realization Z = z, (22) is due to Fatou’s lemma (cf. [35]),
and (23) is a consequence of the Markov chain Z−(Υ,ΥG)−
θ, and independence of Z and ΥG. Note that∫
E{η2z(ΥG)}fZ(z)dz = DD∫
E{ηz(ΥG)}fZ(z)dz = 0
(24)
hold due to (17). We can equivalently consider an instance of
Z = z, where we have E{ηz(ΥG)} = 0 and E{η2z(ΥG)} is
fixed. Noting that θ and ΥG are jointly Gaussian, we invoke
Lemma 2 to conclude that Υ = ΥG minimizes (19). Hence,
without loss of generality, we take Y = X + αθ + T where
T ∼ N(0, σ2T ) is independent of X and θ. Next, we find the
value of α and σ2T at the equilibrium. We first expand DE as
DE =E{(X + θ − Xˆ)2}
=E{(X + θ)2}−E{(2θ +X)Xˆ}−E{(X−Xˆ)Xˆ} (25)
Note that the last term in (25) vanishes due to orthogonality of
the MSE error to the reconstruction Xˆ . The first term in (25)
is constant with respect to the optimization variables (σ2T and
α); hence the objective can be re-expressed as maximizing
E{(2θ + X)Xˆ}, and by replacing the expression for Xˆ as:
maximize
J(α, σ2T )=
 1 + αρ
1 +rα2+2αρ+
σ2T
σ2X
E{(2θ+X)(X+αθ+T )}
=σ2X
 (1 + αρ)(1 + 2αr + αρ+ 2ρ)
1 + rα2 + 2αρ+
σ2T
σ2X
 (26)
over α and σ2T . Clearly, the choice of σ
2
T = 0 maximizes J
irrespective of α. The solutions to dJdα = 0 are
α∗ =
−1±√1 + 4(r + ρ)
2(r + ρ)
(27)
Noting that d
2J
dα2 > 0 for α > 0 and
d2J
dα2 < 0 for α < 0, the
global maximizer of J is either on the boundary or the one
in (14). Noting limα→−∞ J(α, 0) < J(α∗, 0) we obtain (14).
Plugging (14) into (6), and after some algebraic manipulations,
we arrive at (15) and (16).
Remark 3. An interesting aspect of the equilibrium is that
|α| < 1 for all problem parameters. This implies that although
the transmitter wants the receiver to reconstruct X + θ as its
estimate, it does not directly transmit X + θ. A high level
interpretation of this observation is that at the equilibrium the
transmitter never flat out lies.
We next focus on the impact of r on DD. We plot the costs
as a function of r for ρ = 0 in Figure 3a. The following result
is a direct consequence of Theorem 4.
Corollary 1. As r → ∞, DD → σ2X/2, and as r → ρ2,
DD → 0.
The effect of correlation ρ on DE and DD is illustrated in
Figure 3b. As can be seen in Figure 3b, DD is an increasing
function of ρ while DE is decreasing in ρ, as intuitively
expected: if ρ=−1, the objective of the transmitter is to make
Xˆ = 0 (for r = 1), which can be achieved by transmitting
nothing. This equilibrium in this case is referred to as the
“babbling equilibrium” in the cheap talk literature [22]. As ρ
increases, DE increases as well and the transmitted message
becomes more informative for the receiver. At the extremal
point of ρ=1, the receiver can reconstruct X perfectly.
B. Compression
We next characterize RDS for general sources and distor-
tion measures.
Theorem 5. RDS is the convex hull of the set of all triplets
(R,DE , DD) for which there exists a (deterministic) function
h : Y → Xˆ and a conditional distribution p(Y |X, θ) such that
R ≥ I(X, θ;Y )
DE ≥ E{dE(X, θ, h(Y ))}, DD ≥ E{dD(X,h(Y ))}.
The proof of Theorem 5 directly follows from the standard
rate-distortion arguments and is omitted here (see e.g., [16]).
Next, we specialize to the quadratic-Gaussian case.
Lemma 3. All equilibrium points of RDS are achieved,
uniquely, by the jointly Gaussian (X,Y, θ) triplet.
The proof follows from the well-known property of Gaus-
sian distribution achieving maximum entropy under a variance
constraint and the proof of Theorem 4. The following theorem
characterizes the strategic R-D function for the quadratic-
Gaussian equilibrium.
Theorem 6. For the Q-G setting of Problem 2, the equilibrium
(DE , DD) pair in terms of R is:
DD =σ
2
X2
−2R
(
1+(2−2R−1)
(
(r − ρ2)(A− 1)
A(2r +Aρ+ ρ)
))
(28)
DE =σ
2
X
(
1 + 2ρ+ r − (1− 2−2R) A(r + ρ) + ρ
A− 1
)
(29)
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Fig. 3: Numerical analysis of the equilibrium.
where A =
√
1 + 4(r + ρ).
Proof. From Lemma 3, we have Y = X + βθ + S for some
β ∈ R where S ∼ N (0, σ2S) is independent of X and θ.
Plugging this representation in Theorem 5, we obtain the
following characterization of R,DD, DE in terms of σ2S :
R =
1
2
log
(
1 +
σ2X
σ2S
(1 + β2r + 2βρ)
)
(30)
DD = σ
2
X
 β2(r − ρ2) + σ2Sσ2X
1 + 2βρ+ β2r +
σ2S
σ2X
 (31)
DE = σ
2
X
1 + 2ρ+ r − (1 + βρ)(1 + 2βr + βρ+ 2ρ)
1 + rβ2 + 2βρ+
σ2S
σ2X

(32)
Using (44), we have
σ2S = σ
2
X
(
1 + β2r + 2βρ
22R − 1
)
(33)
We next note that the objective of the encoder is to minimize
DE over the possible choices of β, which is equivalent to
maximizing
J(β) =
(1 + βρ)(1 + 2βr + βρ+ 2ρ)
1 + rβ2 + 2βρ
, (34)
which is the same expression as (26) with β replacing α, and
with σ2T = 0 (and σ
2
X = 1). The maximizer of J(β) then
follows from the proof of Theorem 4 as
β∗ =
−1±√1 + 4(r + ρ)
2(r + ρ)
. (35)
Plugging (45) into (31) and (45), and using (35), we arrive at
(28) and (29).
Remark 4. An interesting aspect of strategic Q-G compression
is that the forward test channel of the rate-distortion function
can be expressed as Y = X + β∗θ + S, where β∗ (given in
(35)) is independent of the allowed rate and S ∼ N (0, σ2S)
is independent of X and θ. Moreover β∗ = α, where α is
the coefficient in the simple equilibrium, given in Theorem
4. Hence, the problem of strategic compression simplifies to
compressing X+αθ. This enables, in practice, the use of stan-
dard encoding codes for strategic compression operating on
the effective source X +αθ. We note that such simplifications
do not carry out to settings with receiver SI, as analyzed in
Section IV.
The strategic R-D functions, for fixed ρ = 0, and r = 1 or
r = 0.1, are plotted in Figure 3c.
C. Equilibrium with Noisy Channel
We next analyze the Q-G equilibrium with noisy channel
(described in Section II-E), where we investigate whether the
single-letter strategies similar to ones in Theorem 2 continue
to have Shannon sense optimality.
Theorem 7. For the equilibrium of Q-G Problem 3 with noisy
channel, the strategies
g∗(X, θ)=
√
PT
σ2X(1+2αρ+α
2r)
(X+αθ), h∗(Y )=E{X|Y }
(36)
with α = −1+
√
1+4(r+ρ)
2(r+ρ) are Shannon sense optimal for all
power levels.
Remark 5. If a single-letter strategy is Shannon sense opti-
mal, it is also optimal among all single-letter strategies.
Proof. Using data processing inequality [16],
R(DE) ≤ C(PT ), (37)
one obtains a lower bound on the distortion of any source-
channel coding scheme [10, Theorem 21]. The capacity of the
AWGN channel is given by
C(PT ) =
1
2
log
(
1 +
PT
σ2N
)
. (38)
The strategic R-D function is given in (29). Plugging (29) and
(38) into (37), we obtain
DE ≥ σ2X
1 + 2ρ+ r − (1 + αρ)(1 + 2αr + αρ+ 2ρ)
(1 + rα2 + 2αρ)(1 +
σ2N
PTσ2X
)
 .
Computing distortion associated with the mappings in (36)
yields a lower bound on DE :
DE ≤ σ2X
1 + 2ρ+ r − (1 + αρ)(1 + 2αr + αρ+ 2ρ)
(1 + rα2 + 2αρ)(1 +
σ2N
PTσ2X
)
 .
Noting that inner and outer bounds match, we arrive at the
desired result.
Remark 6. Note that the encoding map at the equilibrium
does not depend on the channel noise variance. Moreover,
paralleling Remark 4, the solution in Theorem 7 also admits
an “effective source” interpretation: the optimal encoding
strategy is identical to the one in the non-strategic setting
stated in Theorem 2, applied to the effective source X + αθ.
IV. IMPACT OF RECEIVER SIDE INFORMATION
Next, we extend our analysis to the receiver side information
setting as shown in Figure 1. We begin with the noiseless
channel case with receiver SI. The focus of our results is the
quadratic-Gaussian setting, i.e., (X, θ,W ) ∼ N (0, RXθW ),
where RXθW is parametrized as
RXθW = σ
2
X
 1 ρX,θ ρX,WρX,θ rθ ρθW
ρX,W ρθW rW

and the distortion measures are given as in (5). The following
lemma states that mappings at the equilibrium are linear (affine
if variables have non-zero mean).
Lemma 4. The equilibrium for the Q-G noiseless channel
setting is achieved by mappings
g(X, θ) = X + αSIθ, h(Y,W ) = bY + cW, (39)
for some αSI , b, c ∈ R.
The proof follows steps identical to those of Theorem 4.
The coefficients, αSI , b, c at this equilibrium can be explicitly
computed as in the case of Theorem 4, but this computation
is rather involved and not included here. Instead, we focus on
the high level impact of SI. We first analyze the benefit of the
presence of receiver SI at the transmitter side. This question
is intimately related to the feedback scenarios in strategic
communication: if the receiver has the option of conveying its
SI to the transmitter, should it choose to do so? Let us define
DSIE and D
SI
D as the distortions of the transmitter and the
receiver at the equilibrium with receiver SI; and DRSIE and
DRSID as the distortions of the transmitter and the receiver
in the setting where SI is also available at the transmitter.
The following theorem states that in the Q-G setting, the
presence of the receiver SI at the transmitter is not useful
to the transmitter or to the receiver.
Theorem 8. In the Q-G setting, the following holds:
DRSIE = D
SI
E , D
RSI
D = D
SI
D .
Proof. We begin by showing optimality of linear strategies in
the setting where SI is available at both the transmitter and the
receiver. First, we constrain the set of encoding strategies so
that the encoding strategy takes (X ′ , X − E{X|W}, θ′ ,
θ − E{θ|W}) as its arguments (as opposed to (X, θ,W ) ).
Due to the jointly Gaussian statistics, (X ′, θ′) are statistically
independent of W . The receiver has also access to W (hence
W is common information), and there is no loss of generality
imposed by this constraint on the encoding strategy, i.e., the
problem is equivalent to the one without any SI with distortion
function of the transmitter E{(X ′+ kθ′− Xˆ)2} for some k ∈
R. The optimality of linear strategies, in X ′, θ′ then follows
from Theorem 4. Since X ′, θ′ are linear functions of X, θ,W ,
due to the jointly Gaussian statistics, the encoding strategy is
linear in X, θ,W as well.
Given that the encoding strategy is in the form of Y =
X + aθ + bW (for some a, b ∈ R), and W is also available
at the receiver, Y = X + aθ and Y = X + aθ + bW yield
identical costs since the receiver can simply subtract bW from
Y . Hence, there is no need for the transmitter to use W in its
encoding strategy.
Remark 7. We note the absence of the constraint associated
with Y in Theorem 8. A constraint on Y , such as an average
power constraint in the form of E{Y 2} ≤ P for some P ∈ R+
renders the realization of W useful to the transmitter and also
to the receiver as will be shown in Theorem 11.
We next consider the compression problem in this setting
(see [36] for the analogous non-strategic problem). The achiev-
able rate-distortion region (R,DE , DD), denoted by RDSIS ,
can be characterized following the arguments in [36] and is
presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 9. RDSIS is the convex hull of the set of all triplets
(R,DE , DD) for which there exist a function h : X×W → Xˆ
and a conditional distribution p(Y |X, θ) such that
R ≥ I(X, θ;Y )− I(Y ;W ) (40)
DE ≥ E{dE(X, θ, h(Y,W ))} (41)
DD ≥ E{dD(X,h(Y,W ))} (42)
Remark 8. In general IT problems, side information has two
types of benefits for the receiver, as demonstrated in Theorem
9 (for a detailed analysis, see [28, Section 11]). The first one is
estimation benefit, which corresponds to the receiver using W
(in addition to Y ) to generate Xˆ , as shown in (41) and (42).
This benefit also exists in the single-letter case. The second
one, namely the rate reduction benefit only exists in the IT
setting, and is demonstrated by the term I(Y ;W ) in (40). In
non-strategic settings, the encoder makes Y correlated with W
to maximize this rate reduction. However, in strategic settings,
there exist problem parameters that render Y independent of
W due to the misalignments of the objectives, dE and dD, and
hence make I(Y ;W ) vanish. This observation plays a pivotal
role in the equilibrium with noisy channel and the receiver SI.
Next, we extend our analysis to the Q-G setting, as shown
in Figure 1, where X, θ,W is jointly Gaussian. The following
lemma characterizes the forward test channel that achieves the
RDSIS .
Lemma 5. In the Q-G setting, RDSIS is achieved by
Y = X + β(R)θ + S
where S ∼ N (0, σ2S) is statistically independent of X , θ and
W . The equilibrium coefficient β(R) and σ2S depend on R.
Proof. The fact that jointly Gaussian X, θ, Y triple achieves
RDSIS follows from Lemma 4 and the entropy maximization
property of jointly Gaussian distributions subject to second
order constraints [37]. From the definition of the problem, we
have the natural Markov chain Y −(X, θ)−W (see e.g., [38]).
Hence, we have
Y = X + βθ + S (43)
for some β ∈ R, and S ∼ N (0, σ2S) is independent of X, θ
and W . Plugging (43) into (40), we have
R=
1
2
log
(
1+
σ2X
σ2S
(
1+β2rθ+2βρXθ− (ρXW +βρθW )
2
rW
))
,
(44)
and into (41), we obtain
DE=σ
2
X
1 +2ρXθ+rθ− (1+βρXθ)(β2rθ+2βρXθ)
1+β2rθ+2βρXθ+
σ2S
σ2X
 ,
noting that h(Y,W ) = E{X|Y,W} due to quadratic dD and
is linear due to jointly Gaussian X,Y,W . Using (44), we have
σ2S
σ2X
=
1
22R−1
(
1 + β2rθ + 2βρXθ− (ρXW +βρθW )
2
rW
)
(45)
We next note that the objective of the encoder is to minimize
DE over the possible choices of β, which is equivalent to
maximizing
J(β) = − (1 + βρXθ)(β
2rθ + 2βρXθ)
1 + β2rθ + 2βρXθ +
σ2S
σ2X
(46)
over β. Plugging (45) into (46) we observe that β∗ =
argmax J(β) depends on R. Note that J is continuous in β
and is bounded above, and hence it admits a maximum by
Weierstrass theorem [35].
Remark 9. As stated in Remark 4, the compression coefficient
(without SI) β∗ is independent of the allowed rate, and
identical to the equilibrium coefficient α in Theorems 4 and
7. Here, due to SI, particularly, the I(Y ;W ) term, β depends
on the allowed rate, and is obviously different from αSI in
Lemma 4 where there is no rate constraint.
Next, we analyze the benefit of the presence of SI at the
transmitter side. At first sight, it might seem that due to the
strategic aspect of the problem at hand, the presence of this SI
should help the transmitter. The following theorem states that
this intuition is not correct; specifically, there is no benefit of
the presence of the receiver SI at the transmitter side.
Theorem 10. In the Q-G setting, the following holds:
RDSIS = RDRSIS .
Proof. We first note that, following the arguments in the proof
of Theorem 8, the transmitter SI does not affect the distortions
(DE and DD). When SI is available at both ends, it can be
shown using the arguments in [39] and Theorem 3 that the
rate expression simplifies to R = min I(X, θ;Y |W ) where
minimization is over all conditional probability distributions
p(Y |X, θ,W ), while when SI is only available at the encoder
we have the same minimization over p(Y |X, θ). Hence, the
only difference is due to the additional Markov chain con-
straint Y − (X, θ) − W . It is well known that for jointly
Gaussian variables this constraint is always satisfied (see e.g.,
[36]), and hence it does not affect the minimization.
Finally, we study the Q-G equilibrium with noisy channel
and receiver SI. We first investigate the optimal single-letter
strategy within the set of linear strategies.
Lemma 6. Optimal linear strategies in the case of the noisy
Q-G setting with SI are
g(X, θ) =
√
PT
σ2X(1+2αSIρX,θ +α
2
SIrθ)
(X + αSIθ),
h(Y,W ) =E{X|Y,W}
where αSI the same coefficient as in Lemma 4.
The proof of Lemma 6 follows from standard minimum
mean-squared error (MMSE) computations, very similar to the
derivation of DE in the proof of Lemma 5. Next, we present
our main result pertaining to this setting.
Theorem 11. In the strategic Q-G setting with channel noise
and receiver SI, single-letter linear strategies provided in
Lemma 6 are Shannon sense optimal if, and only if,
ρX,W = −ρθ,Wβ(R), (47)
where R is given as
R =
1
2
log
(
1 +
PT
σ2N
)
. (48)
Proof. Equating the outer bound obtained via data processing
inequality RSIS (D) ≤ C(P ) to the inner bound achieved by
the linear mapping in Lemma 6, we get a matching condition
which states that for the Shannon sense optimality, the com-
munication channel in Figure 1 must be identical to the R-D
test channel provided in Lemma 59. Note that αSI does not
depend on the channel parameters PT or σ2N . However, β(R)
depends on the rate, and hence on the channel parameters,
due to (48). The only way to make the R-D test channel
identical to the actual one is to operate at the rate which
satisfies β(R) = α. By Theorem 9, β(R) = α implies that
I(Y ;W ) = 0, which is equivalent to statistical independence
of Y and W , which implies uncorrelated variables (due to the
joint Gaussian statistics), and hence we have (47).
Remark 10. Theorem 11 does not preclude the possibility
of optimality of the mappings in Lemma 6 within the set of
single-letter strategies even if they do not satisfy (47) in which
case they are strictly suboptimal in the Shannon sense (i.e.,
among n-letter strategies).
9The same matching condition was obtained in [40] for the non-strategic
variant of the same problem.
V. DECENTRALIZED STOCHASTIC CONTROL PROBLEMS
In this section, we focus on Problem 4. The following
theorem extends the main result of [13] to the strategic setting.
Theorem 12. The essentially unique solution to Problem 4
comprises linear mappings g(X) = c(X + αθ) and h(Y ) =
dY for some α, c, d ∈ R, if, and only if, ϕE and ϕD do not
involve any product terms in U and Xˆ .
Remark 11. Before delving into the proof, we note that the
proof does not directly follow from Theorem 7. This is because
the cross term in the objective functions, E{U(a1X + a2θ)},
for some a1, a2 ∈ R, cannot be upper bounded using Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality (as done in [13] for the term E{XU}),
since a linear mapping for g(X, θ) does not necessarily imply
g(X, θ) = κ(a1X+a2θ) for some κ ∈ R. Hence, in the proof,
we address the problem from the beginning.
Proof. First, we follow very similar steps to ones in [13] to
show that the problem is equivalent to the one with
ϕ′E = (X + θ − Xˆ)2 + k1U2 + k2UX + k3Uθ (49)
ϕ′D = (X − Xˆ)2 (50)
as the objective functions in the underlying stochastic game.
The optimal mapping for the second agent is h(Y ) =
E{X|Y }, and hence, the problem simplifies to optimization
over the encoding mapping g. Consider the dual (equivalent)
problem of minimizing JE = E{ϕ′E} subject to a fixed
JD = E{ϕ′D}. Let us expand JE :
JE = DE + E{k1U2 + k2UX + k3Uθ}. (51)
where
DE = E{(X−E{X|Y })2}+2E{θ(X−E{X|Y })}+E{θ2}.
We follow the same steps as those in the proof of Theorem
4 to conclude that jointly Gaussian triplet Y,X, θ minimizes
DE for any given, fixed JD. Let us now consider the original
problem of minimizing JE . For any given JD, DE , the
problem simplifies to minimization of
E{k1U2 + k2UX + k3Uθ}
subject to fixed DE . Here, E{k1U2} corresponds to a power
constraint of the form E{U2} = PT for some PT ∈ R+, hence
the problem can be transformed into a minimization problem
with hard constraints: minimize E{U(X + k3k2 θ)} subject to
fixed DE and E{U2} = PT . The power constraint ensures
that the optimal U is zero-mean. Noting that (X + k3k2 θ) is
Gaussian, and first and second order moments of U are fixed
(power constraint fixes E{U2}), the same steps that led to
joint Gaussianity of X,Y, θ for fixed JD in the preceding
part of the proof, also yield joint Gaussianity of X, θ and
U (and thus Y ). Hence, for any JD and DE constraint, we
can find a jointly Gaussian U,X, θ that minimizes the cross
terms which are products of a fixed Gaussian random variable
and an optimization variable. The only mapping that yields
jointly Gaussian U,X, θ is linear (or affine if the underlying
variables are not zero-mean). The “only if” part follows from
the observation that an optimal linear strategy implies the
optimality of a linear strategy in the non-strategic setting, by
casting X + kθ as the effective X for some k ∈ R. This
contradicts the “only if” part of Theorem 3.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have addressed some fundamental strategic
communication problems. Tools from information theory have
played a key role in the derivation of our results as:
• The Q-G equilibrium entails unique linear optimal
strategies. The proof is nontrivial and requires results
from probability theory, namely functional representation
lemma and maximal correlation measure, which have
been extensively used in information theory.
• The noisy Q-G equilibrium with noise in the channel
also admits linear optimal strategies. The proof relies
on the fundamental concepts of information theory: data
processing inequality, and the notions of rate-distortion
and channel capacity [10].
• The Q-G equilibrium with receiver SI admits linear
optimal strategies, if there is no channel noise present. For
the noisy channel case, it does so for the very specific,
matched case of the channel noise, the allowed power
and the joint statistics of source-private information-
side information. It is well known that the non-strategic
analogue of this problem does not admit linear optimal
strategies. This sharp contrast between the noiseless and
noisy strategic settings highlights the need for detailed
information-theoretic analysis for such noisy settings.
• We have identified necessary and sufficient conditions
under which general strategic games admit linear optimal
strategies, in a similar manner to non-strategic stochastic
team decision problems [13].
Some future directions include extensions to multi-
dimensional and networked settings, to other (than Gaussian)
statistics; and applications of the developed SIT framework to
other problem areas (for some preliminary work, see [41] for
problems involving privacy constraints).
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